Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

Utah v. Law : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Geoffrey L. Clark; attorney for appellant.
Jeffrey S. Gray; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; attorneys for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Law, No. 20020578 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3885

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20020578-CA

RANDALL LAW,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR ELEVEN COUNTS OF
SECURITIES FRAUD, SIX SECOND DEGREE FELONIES AND FIVE
THIRD DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 61-1-1 (1997), ELEVEN COUNTS OF TRANSACTING BUSINESS AS A
BROKER-DEALER OR AGENT WITHOUT A LICENSE, ALL THIRD
DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-3
(1997), ELEVEN COUNTS OF SELLING AN UNREGISTERED
SECURITY, ALL THIRD DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-7 (1997), AND ONE COUNT OF ENGAGING
IN A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, A SECOND DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (1995), IN
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, UTAH
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING PRESIDING
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Geoffrey L. Clark
2650 Washington Blvd., Ste. 101
Ogden,UT 84401
Attorney for Appellant

David Wayment
Deputy Utah County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20020578-CA

RANDALL LAW,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR ELEVEN COUNTS OF
SECURITIES FRAUD, SIX SECOND DEGREE FELONIES AND FIVE
THIRD DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 61-1-1 (1997), ELEVEN COUNTS OF TRANSACTING BUSINESS AS A
BROKER-DEALER OR AGENT WITHOUT A LICENSE, ALL THIRD
DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-3
(1997), ELEVEN COUNTS OF SELLING AN UNREGISTERED
SECURITY, ALL THIRD DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-7 (1997), AND ONE COUNT OF ENGAGING
IN A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, A SECOND DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (1995), IN
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, UTAH
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING PRESIDING
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Geoffrey L. Clark
2650 Washington Blvd., Ste. 101
Ogden, UT 84401
Attorney for Appellant

David Wayment
Deputy Utah County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

I.

II.

THE RECORD CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE THAT JUDGE HARDING
WAS ABUSING OR UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ILLEGAL DRUGS
AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING

5

IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS WAS WITHIN THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT

7

CONCLUSION

13

ADDENDUM (United States v. Loutos (unpublished))

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
United States v. Loutos, 2003 WL 168627 (N.D. 111. Jan. 24, 2003)

_M

UTAH CASES
Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25,44 P.3d 734

U

State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 52 P.2d 1210

8

State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998)

9

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978)

8

State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,40 P.3d 626

7

State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984)

2, 7

State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8,974 P.2d 279

2, 6

State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1997)
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993)

2, 8,12
8

FEDERAL STATUTES
15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (2002)

12,15

18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (2002)

U, \5

18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (2002)

12
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1997)

I

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1997)

I
ii

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1997)

i

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999)

3, 7, \2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1999)

i

Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-9 (1999)

13

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2001)

1

STATE RULES
Utah R. Evid. 802

6

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20020578-CA

RANDALL LAW,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appealsfromconvictions for eleven counts of securitiesfraud,six second
degree felonies and five third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1
(1997), eleven counts of transacting business as a broker-dealer or agent without a license, all
third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1997), eleven counts of
selling an unregistered security, all third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§61-1-7(1997), and one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Does the record support defendant's claim on appeal that Judge Ray M. Harding
was under the influence of illegal drugs at the sentencing hearing or was otherwise abusing
drugs at the time of sentencing, thereby (1) causing the judge to abuse his discretion in
sentencing defendant, (2) depriving defendant of his due processrights,and (3) creating a
conflict of interest?
Standard ofReview. The record includes no evidence that Judge Harding was under
the influence of drugs or otherwise abusing drugs at the time of sentencing. "An appellate
court's 'review is . . . limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" State v.
Pliego, 1999 UT 8, H 7,974 P.2d 279 (quoting Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699
P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)).
2. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences
on all thirty-four of defendant's securities-related felony convictions?
Standard of Review. Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely
within the discretion of the court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984).
Therefore, this Court will not set aside a trial court's sentencing decision unless itfindsan
abuse of discretion. State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999)
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
* * *

(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances cf the offenses
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of
a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum
of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except
as provided under Subsection 6(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection 6(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii)the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are
imposed.
* * *

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Proceedings
Defendant was charged with eleven counts of securities fraud, eleven counts of
transacting business as a broker-dealer or agent without a license, eleven counts of selling an
unregistered security, and one count of racketeering. R. 72-78. Following a preliminary
hearing, defendant was bound over for trial on all counts. R. 81-88. Pursuant to a plea
agreement reached eight months later, defendant pled guilty to all 34 counts and agreed to
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pay $3.2 million in restitution by May 2002. R. 203, 216; R. 267: 7-14. In exchange,
sentencing was postponed and the State agreed to a reduction in degree of the first six counts
to class A misdemeanors and to the dismissal of the remaining counts so long as restitution
was paid in full by May 2002. R. 203,216,223; R. 267:15-16. When defendant failed to
pay the restitution by May 2002, the court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms of oneto-fifteen years for each second degree felony conviction and zero-to-fr re years for each third
degree felony conviction. R. 246,254-61. Defendant timely appealed. R. 263.
Summary of Proceedings
Because defendant did not include a transcript of the preliminary hearing in the record
on appeal, the State cannot include a summary of the facts constituting defendant's crimes.
Suffice it to say, however, that through Petral Capital, a domestic capital venture company,
and Sun Co., an offshore bank debenture company in Antigua, defendant defrauded more
than one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) from prospective investors. See R. 5-16, 72-78;
Summary of Investigative Findings (SIF), at 1-2, attached to PSI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Nothing in the record supports defendant's assertion that Judge Harding was abusing
drugs or was under the influence of drugs at the time of sentencing.

Accordingly,

defendant's claims that the alleged drug abuse resulted in an abuse of discretion at
sentencing, a violation of defendant's due process rights, and a conflict of interest fail. This
court should strike the newspaper articles in the addendum to defendant's brief because they
are not included in the record.
4

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive
prison terms. Contrary to defendant's claim, the statutory factors in this case warranted the
consecutive sentences. Defendant's fraudulent scheme resulted in losses to victims of more
than $ 1,000,000.00. In addition to their financial losses, many victims suffered tremendous
emotional consequences, including strained marriages, loss of time with family, and even
thoughts of suicide. Finally, defendant demonstrated a pervasive pattern of fraud, even after
he pled guilty. In light of these factors, it cannot be said that no reasonable person would
impose such a sentence. Nor does the sentence impede the Board of Pardons' flexibility to
release defendant early if mitigating circumstances warrant it.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE RECORD CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE THAT JUDGE HARDING
WAS ABUSING OR UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ILLEGAL DRUGS
AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING
Defendant contends that Judge Harding abused his discretion at sentencing because

"he was regularly abusing drugs and suffering the physical consequences of the drugs," Aplt.
Brf. at 8-10, that defendant's rights to due process and procedural fairness at sentencing were
violated as a result of Judge Harding's '^undisclosed abuse of illegal drugs[ ] and the physical
and mental affects of such drug abuse," Aplt. Brf. at 13-14, and that Judge Harding's illegal
drug abuse represented a conflict of interest and "infringed on his ability to perform his
judicial duties without bias or prejudice," Aplt. Brf. at 14-17. These claims fail for lack of
record support.
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Nothing in the record supports defendant's claim that Judge Harding was abusing
drugs or was under the influence of drugs at the time of sentencing. In support of his claim,
defendant cites to three articlesfromThe Daily Herald, not included in the record, describing
his pending criminal and divorce proceedings. See Aplt. Brf. at 5-6, 8. However, the law is
well settled that "[a]n appellate court's 'review i s . . . limited to the evidence contained in the
record on appeal.'" State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, U 7,974 P.2d 279 (quoting Wilderness Bldg.
Sys.f Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)). Defendant has nevertheless
attempted to supplement the record by including in the addendum to his brief the newspaper
articles upon which he relies. See Aplt. Brf., Addenda A-C. As held by the Supreme Court
in Pliego, "an appellant's addendum may not consist of evidence that is outside the record on
appeal." Pliego, 1999 UT 8, at f 7. The Court should therefore "strike this extraneous
evidence and [ ] not consider it for purposes of this appeal." See Id}
Because the record contains no evidence of Judge Harding's alleged drug use, this
Court will not consider it on appeal. Id. Accordingly, defendant's claims based on Judge
Harding's alleged drug abuse fail.

1

Even if the newspaper articles were properly included in the record, they would have
no probative value because they are nothing more than hearsay reports of pending court
proceedings, the final disposition of which have not been decided. See Utah R. Evid. 802
(providing that hearsay evidence is not admissible).
6

11.

IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS WAS WITHIN
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT
Defendant contends that even absent any allegation of drug abuse, imposition of

consecutive sentences constituted an abuse of the court's discretion. Aplt. Brf. at 10-12. He
complains that the trial court did not "fully" consider certain statutory factors. Aplt. Brf. at
12. However, "the fact that [defendant] views his situation differently than did the trial court
does not prove that the trial court neglected to consider the [statutory] factors." State v.
Helms, 2002 UT 12, at \ 14,40 P.3d 626. "[T]he burden is on [defendant] to show that the
trial court did not properly consider all the factors." Id. at 16. He has not met this burden.
Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely within the discretion
of the [trial] court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984). Where a defendant
has been found guilty of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). The trial court may impose
consecutive sentences for multiple crimes even if the offenses were committed in the course
of a single criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(5). In determining whether or not
to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must "consider the gravity and circumstances
of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah
Code Ann. §76-3-401(4).
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Although the Supreme Court has stated that section 76-3-401 favors concurrent
sentences, State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993),2 it has also emphasized that
appellate courts "afford the trial court wide latitude in sentencing," State v. Bluff, 2002 UT
66, f 66, 52 P.2d 1210. Accordingly, a trial court's sentencing decision will not be set aside
absent a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)/see
also Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at f 66. "To do otherwise would have a chil^-e effect on the trial
court which has the main responsibility for sentencing . . . . " Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.
An abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court did not consider all legally relevant
factors or if the sentence is inherently unfair or clearly excessive. State v. Schweitzer, 943
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). The appellate court, however, will not find an abuse of
discretion unless it concludes "that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by
the trial court.'" Id. (quoting Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887).

2

The Supreme Court in Strunk cited Section 76-3-401(1) in support of the proposition
that the statute favors concurrent sentences. That section provides: "Sentences for state
offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run
consecutively." Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301. Thus, contrary to the court's conclusion, that
section does not favor concurrent sentences, but simply creates a presumption that a trial
court intended the sentences to be served concurrently if the court was silent on the issue.
8

Citing State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), defendant argues that his sentences
should have been concurrent because (1) "all the felony counts are considered 'white collar'
offenses" involving "no physical injuries to any victims," (2) he "accepted full responsibility
for his actions and a willingness to make restitution," and (3) he has "no prior criminal
history." Aplt. Brf. at 13. Defendant's reliance on Galli, however, is misplaced.
In Galli, defendant was sentenced by three different courts to consecutive prison terms
of five years to life based on his pleas of guilty to three armed robberies. Galli, 967 P.2d at
932-33. The Supreme Court reversed the consecutive prison sentences after concluding that
the trial courts did not properly consider a number of mitigating circumstances. Id. at 938.
For example, the amount of money taken was "relatively small" (approximately $ 1,500). Id.
932,938. Galli injured no one and used a pellet gun "incapable of inflicting serious injury."
Id. at 938. Galli had only minor traffic offenses and one misdemeanor theft conviction. Id.
Galli voluntarily confessed, admitted responsibility, and expressed a commitment to improve.
Id. Finally, he demonstrated promise for rehabilitation, going three years without violating
the law after his arrest but before sentencing. Id.
In this case, the trial court read "in full" the presentence investigation report (PSI).
R. 291: 3. A review of that PSI reveals that unlike Galli, the mitigating circumstances here
fall far short of compelling concurrent sentences.
Where the amount of money taken by Galli was relatively small, the amount taken by
defendant was enormous. His victims lost more than one million dollars ($1,027,250.00).
R. 291: 10; PSI at 7. This amount, however, apparently represented only the tip of the
9

iceberg in terms of the amount he had taken. As part of the plea bargain, defendant agreed to
pay $3.2 million in restitution to victims of his fraudulent schemes. R. 216; R. 267: 5. In all,
his deception reached out to more than 30 victims in this scheme alone. PSI at 3.
As in Galli, defendant inflicted no physical injuries upon his victims. However, his
fraud and deceit inflicted an incalculable emotional toll on many of his victims with longlasting effects. At defendant's sentencing, one victim eloquently de^~ribed the emotional
impact of defendant's crimes as follows:
Just because of his 34 crimes that he pled guilty to were not done at
gunpoint doesn't make them less of a crime. He chooses lies and deceit as his
weapons. These weapons do create victims. People have lost homes. There
have been divorces, bankruptcies, and a multitude of personal suffering that
this man has created with his weapons of lies and deceit.
R. 291: 7; see also R. 291: 6-7; PSI at 3-6,12 (victims attesting to loss of homes, retirement
funds, and savings, forcing some into bankruptcy). One victim described the "emotional and
physical stress" on his family, taking both him and his wife awayfromtheir children because
his wife was forced to go to work and he was forced to work longer days. PSI at 4. Another
described the strain caused on his marriage. PSI at 5. Still another told of his thoughts of
suicide because defendant had "ruined [their] lives." PSI at 6.
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While defendant had no prior criminal history, the PSI revealed that he was presently
under indictment on several counts of mailfraudby the United States Attorney's Office in
Chicago in connection with another investment scheme. PSI at 8.3 The PSI also revealed
that defendant had been defrauding people through various schemes for years. See PSI.
Although defendant verbally accepted responsibility by pleading guilty to the charges
and agreeing to pay restitution, his actions following the plea bargain have not demonstrated
that acceptance. He promised to pay $3.2 million to victims within six months. Yet, in his
statement to AP & P, defendant said he was "broke." PSI at 10. He failed to report to
AP & P to assist in the preparation of a PSI, resulting in his incarceration pending sentencing.
PSI at 7. And in the statement he gave to AP & P at the jail, he deflected responsibility to
his partner and contacts. PSI at 3. He also attributed the inability to keep their promises to
"complications" and "delays." PSI at 3. Nowhere did he acknowledge his deceit and utter
failure to obey the law. See PSI at 3.
Finally, defendant's conduct following the change of plea hearing also demonstrates
little to no promise of rehabilitation. Twice while defendant was on pretrial release in this
case he was arrested on new charges offraudby authorities in Utah County. R. 291: 5. Even
as he sat in jail awaiting sentencing, defendant reported as a potential asset a formula for non-

A search of Westlaw reveals that defendant and his co-defendants were subsequently
convicted. See United States v. Loutos, 2003 WL 168627 (N.D. 111. Jan. 24, 2003). In
accordance with the holding in Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, f 16,44 P.3d 734, a
copy of that opinion is included in the Addendum.

11

dairy milk which he believed "has the potential to earn him a sufficient amount of money if it
could be marketed." PSI at 10. Thus, notwithstanding his securities fraud convictions here,
his pending mail fraud charges in Illinois, and injunctions imposed by the federal Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), defendant was still intent on making money through
investment schemes. See SIF at 1.
Defendant also contends that the consecutive sentences are "vast11/ disproportionate to
his offense" and are otherwise clearly excessive. Aplt. Brf. at 12. However, he offers no
other reason to support this claim. Because section 76-3-401 limits the aggregate maximum
of all sentences imposed to 30 years, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-40 l(6)(a), defendant's sentence
is the equivalent of an indeterminate prison sentence of 7 to 30 years. Contrary to
defendant's claim, this is not an inherently unfair sentence given the number of lives
defendant has affected, the toll his crimes have placed on victims both financially and
emotionally, and defendant's pervasive pattern offraud,even after pleading guilty to the
charges here. Indeed, a single conviction for similar crimes under federal law subjects a
defendant to prison terms comparable to that which defendant received here. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C.A. § 77x (2002) (5 years for securitiesfraud);18U.S.C.A. § 1341 (2002) (20 years for
mailfraud);18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (2002) (20 years for wire fraud). In other words, it cannot
be said "that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."'
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quoting Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887).
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Nor can it be said that the sentence improperly impedes the flexibility of the Board of
Pardons to adjust defendant's prison stay to match his progress and rehabilitation. The
magnitude of the financial losses incurred (> $1 million), the emotional devastation suffered
by defendant's victims (seven named in the information), and defendant's pervasive pattern
of fraud, even after he pled guilty, make it eminently reasonable that defendant serve at least
seven years in prison. Even then, the Board of Pardons has the authority fn release defendant
before his minimum term has been served if mitigating circumstances so warrant. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-9(1 )(b) (1999).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's sentences. The State also requests the Court to strike the newspaper articles
included in defendant's addendum.
Respectfully submitted on February 6, 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

^^Ep^REY S. GRAY
/^^Cssistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
F:\Jgray\Law\Law Ran brf.doc
02/06/2003 4:19 PM
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ADDENDUM

Slip Copy
(Cite as: 2003 WL 168627 (N.D.II1.))

Page I

H
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,
N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
Peter A. LOUTOS, Sr., Defendant.

FN1. This charge and conduct will be
referred to as "bank fraud."
FN2. Guideline 2F1.1 is not contained in the
current (Nov.2002) Guidelines Manual. The
Plea Agreement does not specify which
year's Guidelines Manual was relied upon.

/. Background
No. 01 CR 852-3.
Jan. 24,2003.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HART, J.
*1 Defendant Peter Loutos pleaded guilty to one
count of making a false statement on an application
for the purpose of influencing a federally insured
bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1014 and 2. [FN1]
The preliminary Sentencing Guideline calculation
contained in the Plea Agreement applied U.S.S.G. §
2F1.1 [FN2] and determined a total offense level of
four and a criminal history category of I for a
sentencing range of zero to six months. The
Presentence Report ("PSR") that has been prepared
reached the same sentencing range, but by applying
Guideline 2B1.1 of the current Guidelines Manual.
At the time of the plea colloquy, the court deferred
acceptance of the plea. After hearing the evidence
that was presented at the trial of Loutos's
codefendants and having considered the PSR,
submissions of the parties, and possible Guideline
results, on January 23, 2003, die court accepted
Loutos's plea of guilty. However, a determination of
the appropriate sentencing range will only be made
after considering additional facts not presently
disclosed in the Plea Agreement or PSR. A final
determination as to the appropriate sentencing range
will not be made until after die parties have had an
adequate opportunity to address the additional facts.
The purpose of today's order is to (a) outline
additional issues and facts that the court will consider
for purposes of sentencing Loutos and (b) set forth a
schedule and procedures that will provide the parties
with an adequate opportunity to address the
additional issues and facts. Most of the issues
mentioned herein were previously indicated to the
parties in the December 27, 2002 Minute Order and
at the January 23, 2003 status hearing.

The original indictment in this case alleged:
defendants FRANK PbiTZ, DANIEL BENSON,
PETER LOUTOS, ROBERT PALADINO,
RANDALL LAW, MONICA ILES and others,
through FLP Capital, Active International [, Inc.]
and Lennox [Investment Group, Ltd.], sought to
and did obtain and retain funds from prospective
investors and investors by offering and selling
investments purportedly in the international trading
of bank financial instruments. In offering and
selling these investments, the defendants made and
caused to be made material misrepresentations and
omissions about, among other things: the risk
involved in the investment; the expected return on
the investment; the use of money raised from
investors; and the previous investment experience
and the criminal and regulatory background of
thoseoffering and selling the investment. As a part
of the scheme, the defendants raised over
$11,000,000 from at least 30 investors and then
misappropriated almost all of the funds for their
own benefit. In order to retain the use of investors'
funds and obtain additional funds from new
investors and to conceal various parts of the
scheme from victim investors and others,
defendants continued to lull investors through a
series of misrepresentations and omissions about
the nature and status of their investments as well as
by repaying earlier, disgruntled investors with
fimdsfromnew investors.
*2 Indictment % 3.
All six defendants were charged with eight
substantive counts of wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § §
1343 and 2. The alleged wire
communications underlying these counts occurred
from October 10,1996 through May 22, 1997. [FN3]
Defendants Peitz, Benson, Loutos, and Paladino were
also charged with a conspiracy in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956(h) under which they agreed to (1)
conduct financial transactions involving the proceeds
of the wire fraud scheme in order to promote the
scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i);

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Slip Copy
(Cite as: 2003 WL 168627 (N.D.I11.))
(2) engage in wire fraud violations that were
designed to conceal the source and ownership of
unlawful proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(l)(B)(i); and (3) engage in monetary
transactions in criminally derived property with a
value greater than $10,000 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1957(a). The conspiracy allegedly began no later than
October 1994 and continued until at least June 1998.
The four alleged conspirators were also charged with
five substantive counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § §
1957 and 2 and two substantive counts of violating
18 U.S.C. § § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) and 2.

FN3. The wire fraud scheme will be referred
to as "investment fraud ."
During pretrial proceedings in this case, a large
volume of potential documentary evidence was made
available for inspection by the defendants. As of
September 11, 2002, the trial of all six defendants
was set for November 4, 2002. On October 23, 2002,
the government submitted its ''Santiago" proffer. See
United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th
Cir.1978); United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d
518, 522 & n. 1 (7th Cir.2001). The proffer assumed
Loutos was going to trial and outlined the factual
support for finding Loutos to be a member of the
charged conspiracy and for admitting against him the
statements of his alleged coconspirators. However,
on October 30, 2002, a superseding information was
filed and Loutos pleaded guilty to the one bank fraud
charge contained in the information. The offense to
which Loutos pleaded guilty occurred in June 1996.
As had been scheduled, the trial of Loitfos's
codefendants began on November 4, 2002. On
December 11, 2002, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty as to all counts and defendants, except that
they returned a verdict of not guilty as to one count
(Count 13) of violating § 1957. Sentencing for the
five defendants who went to trial is presently set for
March 12, 2003.
//. Opportunity To Be Heard
A defendant must be provided with an adequate
opportunity to address those issues and facts that will
be considered in determining his or her sentence. See
United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101, 1105-09 (7th
Cir.1994).
In summary, we reiterate that Rule 32 and § 6A1.3
of the Guidelines require both reasonable advance
notice, i.e., knowledge, of the ground on which the
district court is contemplating an enhancement as
well as a meaningful opportunity to challenge the
issue. The right to challenge a sentencing issue
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encompasses the right to present favorable
evidence, including the presentation of witnesses
when appropriate under U.S.S.G. §
6A1.3.
Advance notice means that prior to the sentencing
hearing the defense must be informed via the PSR,
the prosecutor's recommendation or the court that a
specific sentencing enhancement is being
contemplated, e.g., an abuse of trust enhancement.
When defense counsel is unaware until the
sentencing hearing is in progress that the court is
considering an enhancement, counsel is denied an
opportunity to prepare and call witnesses, as
allowed under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, much less to
present evidence on disputed facts. Moreover, he is
not permitted adequate :ui:e •;•> prepare case law
challenging the adequacy of the Guideline factor as
it applies to the factual circumstances at hand.
*3W. at 1108-09.
Today's order will set forth pertinent issues that will
be considered at the time of sentencing. [FN4]
Today's order also outlines additional facts and
evidence that will be considered at the time of
sentencing. Further, the government will be required
to provide Loutos and the probation officer [FN5]
with a copy of the government version of the offense
that has been prepared for the sentencing of the other
five defendants, as well as a supplemental statement
regarding Loutos. In accordance with the schedule set
forth in § IX below, the parties will be provided the
opportunity to submit sentencing memoranda
addressing the issues.

FN4. In a minute order dated December 27,
2002, the court summarily set forth some
issues for the parties to address. The
government's one- paragraph filing failed to
address any of the issues set forth in the
minute order. Defendant's January 15, 2003
Memorandum addressed some, but not all,
of the pertinent issues. Some potential issues
were also discussed at the January 23, 2003
status hearing. Today's order will ensure that
the parties are aware of the pertinent issues
that need to be addressed and that they have
a fair opportunity to address them.

FN5. As to any further sentencing
memoranda or sentence-related documents
that the parties file with the court, they shall
also provide a copy to the probation officer.

In his January 15, 2003 Memorandum ("January 15
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Memorandum"), Loutos pointed out that the
government had not contended there is any relevant
conduct nor does the PSR recite any and, further,
"defendant, not having been present or represented at
the trial and with no discovery on this issue, is not
aware of what specific facts the Court intends to
consider concerning any alleged relevant conduct."
That statement is somewhat disingenuous. Although
Loutos did not attend the trial of his codefendants,
Loutos was actively involved in preparing for trial
until shortly before his codefendants went to trial.
Loutos had access to and took the opportunity to
examine the voluminous amount of documents that
were made available in pretrial proceedings. He also
received the government's Santiago proffer outlining
evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy.
Defendant is also well aware of the wire fraud
scheme that was charged in the original indictment.
While defendant may not be aware of how the
evidence specifically played out at trial, he is well
aware of what evidence was available for trial and is
well aware of the contours of the charged scheme.
Moreover, while a dispute possibly exists as to the
amount of loss, it is probably more likely that Loutos
has little dispute as to the amount of loss that was
caused by the wire fraud scheme. Instead, the likely
area of dispute is Loutos's involvement in the wire
fraud scheme. In any event, today's order and the
procedures set forth herein provide Loutos with
adequate notice of the facts and evidence at issue.
Additionally, the transcript of the trial will be
available prior to the date a final determination will
be made as to Loutos's sentence.
///. Sentencing Evidence
Facts found for purposes of applying the Sentencing
Guidelines in this case must be found by a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v.
Smith. 308 F.3d 726, 743-45 (7th Cir.2002). Since
any sentence that will be imposed will be below the
30-year statutory maximum applicable to violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, there is no Apprendi problem
that requires that any additional facts be either
admitted by defendant or proven before a jury. See
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Smith,
308F.3dat745.
Findings for purposes of sentencing may be based on
any reliable evidence, including hearsay or other
evidence that would not ordinarily be admissible at
trial. United States v. Schaefer, 291 F.3d 932, 942
(7th Cir.2002); United States v. Martinez, 289 F.3d
1023, 1028-29 (7th Cir.2002); United States v.
Poison, 285 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir.2002); United
States v. Chavez- Chavez, 213 F.3d 420, 422 (7th
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Cir.2000). At sentencing, the court may consider
evidence that was before it in a trial, sentencing
hearing, or plea of a codefendant. United States v
Pippen, 115 F.3d 422, 425 (7th Cir.1997); United
States v. Morales, 994 F.2d 386, 389-90 (7th
Cir.1993); United States v. Hardamon, 188 F.3d 843,
850 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Nesbitt.
852 F.2d 1502, 1521-22 (7th Cir.1988), cert denied,
488 U.S. 1015 (1989)). It is only necessary that the
defendant receive sufficient notice that evidence from
the other hearing will be considered and the
opportunity to consider and respond to such
evidence. See Morales, 994 F.2d at 389-90. Loutos
has an adequate opportunitv to consider the evidence
that was presented at the trial of his codefendants.
Also, to the extent any codefendant is sentenced prior
to Loutos and evidence from a codefendant's
sentencing hearing is to be considered, Loutos will be
provided the opportunity to consider and respond to
any such evidence.
IV. Provisions of Loutos's Plea Agreement
*4 Paragraph 17 of Loutos's Plea Agreement, which
concerns restitution, states in part: "The parties
stipulate and agree that there was no loss resulting
from the defendant's false claim." The Plea
Agreement also contains the following provisions.
After reciting facts underlying the offense, it is
stated: "Defendant also admits that these facts are not
a complete statement of defendant's knowledge of
and involvement in the charged offense." Plea
Agreement % 5. The government is permitted to
correct errors in the Guideline calculation. Id. % 1
("Errors in calculations or interpretation of any of the
guidelines may be corrected by either party prior to
sentencing."). Loutos may not withdraw his plea
because such a correction is made. Id. Also, the Plea
Agreement provides that the government is to "fully
apprise the District Court and the United States
Probation Office of the nature, scope and extent of
defendant's conduct regarding the charges against
him in this case, and related matters, including all
matters in aggravation and mitigation relevant to the
issue of sentencing." Id. % 14. Additionally, the Plea
Agreement contains the standard provision that the
court is not bound by the Agreement, id. ^ 16, and
that the court makes the final determination as to the
appropriate Guideline determination, id. % 6(e).
Loutos may not withdraw his plea if the court reaches
a different conclusion than the tentative Guideline
calculation contained in the Plea Agreement. Id.
The stipulation in ^ 17 refers only to losses resulting
from defendant's false statement. This stipulation
should probably be read as being limited to losses
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directly resulting from the false statement bank fraud
offense. The stipulation does not refer to any losses
resulting from any possible relevant conduct and
Loutos apparently so understands the stipulation in
that his January 15 Memorandum treats relevant
conduct and any related losses as being distinct from
the issue of loss attributed to the bank fraud charge.
See Jan. 15 Memo, at 4.
Even if the stipulation contained in f 17 were to be
construed broadly so as to apply to any possible
losses attributed to Loutos, the court is not precluded
from considering evidence that indicates otherwise.
Guideline 6B 1.4(d), a policy statement, provides:
"The court is not bound by the stipulation, but may
with the aid of the presentence report, determine the
facts relevant to sentencing." See also United States
v. miliams, 198 F.3d 988, 994 (7th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Mankiewicz, 122 F.3d 399, 403 n. 1 (7th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Bennett, 990 F.2d 998,
1003 (7th Cir. 1993). The commentary to Guideline
6B1.4 provides in part:
... [I]t is not appropriate for the parties to stipulate
to misleading or non-existent facts, even when both
parties are willing to assume the existence of such
"facts" for purposes of the litigation. Rather, the
parties should fully disclose the actual facts and
then explain to the court the reasons why the
disposition of the case should differ from that
which such facts ordinarily would require under the
guidelines.
***
*5 Section 6B 1.4(d) makes clear that the court is
not obliged to accept the stipulation of the parties.
Even though stipulations are expected to be
accurate and complete, the court cannot rely
exclusively upon stipulations in ascertaining the
factors relevant to the determination of sentence.
Rather, in determining the factual basis for the
sentence, the court will consider the stipulation,
together with the results of the presentence
investigation, and any other relevant information.
In the Plea Agreement, Loutos specifically admits
that facts stated therein do not constitute a complete
statement of Loutos's knowledge of and involvement
in the offense. Evidence presented at his
codefendants' trial supports that Loutos was aware of
and knowingly and intentionally participated in the
investment fraud offenses. [FN6] Paragraph 14 of the
Plea Agreement expressly provides mat the
government is to fully apprise both the court and
probation officer of the extent of Loutos's conduct,
including any matters in aggravation pertinent to his
sentencing. Thus, both the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. §

Page 4

6B1.4; Bennett, 990 F.2d at 1003; United States v
Telesco, 962 F.2d 165, 168 (2d Cir.1992); United
States v. Holland, 59 F.Supp.2d 492, 532
(D.Md.1998), and the Plea Agreement place a duty
on the government to be fully forthcoming regarding
Loutos's involvement in possible relevant conduct. It
may be that the government believes there are
weaknesses in its case against Loutos that justified
dropping allegations of involvement in a $14,000,000
[FN7] wire fraud scheme and instead enter into a Plea
Agreement possibly providing for a zero-to-sixmonth sentencing range. However, if it so believed,
the Guidelines provide that the government should
disclose all pertinent facts and explain the basis for
entering into the Plea A^re^ment. The government
has not made such a representation. In all further
filings, however, the government shall be fully
forthcoming regarding the evidence related to Loutos.
To the extent reasons exist for the nature of the Plea
Agreement, the government may set forth such
reasons where appropriate, but it still must also set
forth those facts that may connect Loutos to the
investment fraud.

FN6. The court is not presently making a
determination as to Loutos's knowledge and
participation. It is only being noted that
evidence was presented from which such a
conclusion could have reasonably been
reached.

FN7. At the codefendants' trial, it was
indicated that this figure represented the loss
to investors resulting from the investment
fraud and evidence was submitted to support
this contention.

V. Relevant Conduct
As previously indicated, a key issue for Loutos's
sentencing is whether the investment fraud that the
jury found the codefendants were involved in
constitutes relevant conduct for the bank fraud
offense to which Loutos has pleaded guilty.
Guideline IB 1.3(a) provides:
(a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three
(Adjustments). Unless otherwise specified, (i) the
base offense level where the guideline specifies
more than one base offense level, (ii) specific
offense characteristics and (iii) cross references in
Chapter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter
Three, shall be determined on the basis of the
following:
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(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided,
abetted,
counseled,
commanded,
induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and
*6 (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal
activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or
enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert
with others, whether or not charged as a
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during
the commission of the offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for
that offense;
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for
which § 3D 1.2(d) would require grouping of
multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in
subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part
of the same course of conduct or common scheme
or plan as the offense of conviction;
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and
omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2)
above, and all harm that was the object of such acts
and omissions; and
(4) any other information specified in the
applicable guideline.
As to subsection (a)(1)(B), Application Note 2
states:
A "jointly undertaken criminal activity" is a
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise
undertaken by the defendant in concert with others,
whether or not charged as a conspiracy.
In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity,
subsection (a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is
accountable for the conduct (acts and omissions) of
others that was both:
(i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity; and
(ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity.
Because a count may be worded broadly and
include the conduct of many participants over a
period of time, the scope of the criminal activity
jointly undertaken by the defendant (the "jointly
undertaken criminal activity") is not necessarily the
same as the scope of the entire conspiracy, and
hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the same
for every participant. In order to determine the
defendant's accountability for the conduct of others
under subsection (a)(1)(B), the court must first
determine the scope of the criminal activity the
particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake
(i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and
objectives embraced by the defendant's agreement).
The conduct of others that was both in furtherance
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of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with,
the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the
defendant is relevant conduct under this provision.
The conduct of others that was not in furtherance
of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the
defendant, or was not reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity, is not
relevant conduct under this provision.
Application Note 2 also specifically states: "Note
that the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to
jointly undertake, and the reasonably foreseeable
conduct of others in furtherance of that criminal
activity, are not necessar^y identical."
*7 As to subsection (a)(2), Application Note 9
provides:
"Common scheme or plan" and "same course of
conduct" are two closely related concepts.
(A) Common scheme or plan. For two or more
offenses to constitute part of a common scheme or
plan, they must be substantially connected to each
other by at least one common factor, such as
common victims, common accomplices, common
purpose, or similar modus operandi. For example,
the conduct of five defendants who together
defrauded a group of investors by computer
manipulations that unlawfully transferred funds
over an eighteen-month period would qualify as a
common scheme or plan on the basis of any of the
above listed factors; i.e., the commonality of
victims (the same investors were defrauded on an
ongoing basis), commonality of offenders (the
conduct constituted an ongoing conspiracy),
commonality of purpose (to defraud the group of
investors), or similarity of modus operandi (the
same or similar computer manipulations were used
to execute the scheme).
(B) Same course of conduct. Offenses that do not
qualify as part of a common scheme or plan may
nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of
conduct if they are sufficiently connected or related
to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they
are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing
series of offenses. Factors that are appropriate to
the determination of whether offenses are
sufficiently connected or related to each other to be
considered as part of the same course of conduct
include the degree of similarity of the offenses, the
regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time
interval between the offenses. When one of the
above factors is absent, a stronger presence of at
least one of the other factors is required. For
example, where the conduct alleged to be relevant
is relatively remote to the offense of conviction, a
stronger showing of similarity or regularity is
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necessary to compensate for the absence of
temporal proximity. The nature of the offenses may
also be a relevant consideration (e.g., a defendant's
failure to file tax returns in three consecutive years
appropriately would be considered as part of the
same course of conduct because such returns are
only required at yearly intervals).
Under subsection (a)(1)(B), the scope of Loutos's
jointly undertaken activity must first be determined.
The second step is then to determine which conduct
of others was reasonably foreseeable. United States v.
Thomas, 199 F.3d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir.1999).
Loutos's knowledge of the investment fraud is
relevant to both inquiries. Id. In his January 15
Memorandum, Loutos contends there is no evidence
that he had any knowledge of or knowingly joined in
the criminal acts and conspiracy of the other
defendants. In his plea, Loutos has admitted that he
jointly acted with Benson in making false
representations when opening a Lennox bank
account. The evidence shows that Lennox was a
company that engaged only in false and fraudulent
transactions. It is clear from the evidence presented at
the codefendants' trial that the bank fraud was an
integral part of the investment fraud scheme proven
at that trial. Evidence presented at the codefendants*
trial also supported [FN8] that, besides making false
statements in order to open the Lennox bank account,
Loutos (a) aided in representations to investors that
an actual escrow account existed; (b) allowed his
attorney trust account to be used to launder funds; (c)
made false statements in connection with an
interpleader action; (d) aided in the distribution of
bank confirmations bearing the name of his law firm;
(e) aided in the transfer of investor funds, e.g., the
transfer of $250,000 to a London company; (f)
provided letters that aided the investment scheme,
e.g., the August 2, 1996 letter to Law; (g) advised
potential witnesses not to cooperate with fraud
investigators; and (h) obtained some of the proceeds
of the investment fraud. Besides being evidence that
Loutos intentionally aided and participated in the
investment fraud, Loutos's involvement provided him
with information about die codefendants1 fraudulent
investment activity. [FN9] It could be found from this
evidence that Loutos was well aware of the
fraudulent nature of the codefendants* investment
activity or that the investment fraud of the others was
reasonably foreseeable. From the aforementioned
evidence, it could further be found that Loutos's
agreement to engage in the bankfraudwas part of an
understanding that he was aiding the investment
fraud as well. Therefore, it could be found that the
investment fraud by Benson and others that followed
the bank fraud was in furtherance of the bank fraud
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activity in which Loutos engaged. The evidence
presented at the codefendants' trial could support a
finding, under Guideline IB 1.3(a)(1)(B), that the
investment fraud is relevant conduct.

FN8. Again, it is only being stated that
evidence was presented from which such a
finding could reasonably be made. No final
determination is presently being made
regarding
Loutos's
knowledge
or
participation.

FN9. At least as c»rl> as July 2, 1996,
Loutos received a copy of a letter
complaining that certain investor funds
should be held in the purported escrow
account. Govt. Exh. First of America No.
68.

*8 Alternatively, based on the evidence presented at
the codefendants' trial, it could be found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Loutos was a
member of the conspiracy as charged in Count 9 of
the original indictment. That would support a finding
that the investment fraud was relevant conduct to the
bank fraud. See United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera,
293 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir.2002); United States v.
KubicK 205 F.3d 1117,1127-28 (9th Cir.1999).
To the extent the investment fraud were to be found
to be relevant conduct, the harm caused by the
investment fraud would be part of the loss calculation
in determining the offense level under the applicable
Guideline. See U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(aX3); Schaefer,
291F.3dat939.
VI. Alternative Considerations
Two other possibilities exist for considering the
investment fraud loss in determining Loutos's
sentencing range. The first is whether the investment
loss would still be considered to have been caused by
the bank fraud. See United States v. Seward, 272 F
.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir.2001). If it is determined that
Guideline 2B1.1 (2002) is the appropriate Guideline
to apply, then the causation definitions contained in
that Guideline would have to be considered. See
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 comment. (nn.2(AX0, 2{AXiv))
(2002).
The other possibility is an upward departure in
accordance with U .S.S.G. § 2F1.1 comment, (n.
10(b)) (1995). That Note provides: "In cases in which
the loss determined under (b)(1) does not fully
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capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the
conduct, an upward departure may be warranted.
Examples may include the following: ... (b) false
statements were made for the purpose of facilitating
some other crime." In the event that the investment
fraud is not found to be relevant conduct, it will be
considered whether an upward departure is
appropriate under this provision. Alternatively, if it
were found that there is no ex post facto problem
with applying the current version of Guideline 2B1.1,
then the appropriate application note to consider
regarding an upward departure from that Guideline is
Application Note 15(A), including 15(A)(iv).
VII Possible Guidelines Calculation and
Adjustments
If the investment fraud were to be found to be
relevant conduct and the related loss found to be in
excess of $10,000,000, the court has tentatively
determined that the following adjustments would
need to be considered in determining the total offense
level. This is being set forth so as to enable the
parties to address possible adjustments and other
Guideline issues. As previously stated, whether or not
the investment fraud is relevant conduct will not be
determined until after the parties have had an
adequate opportunity to address the issue.
The parties stipulated that the applicable Guideline is
2F1.1. Ordinarily, the Guidelines in effect at the time
of sentencing are to be considered. U.S.S.G. §
1B1.11(a) (2002). Effective November 1, 2001,
Guideline 2F1.1 was deleted and instead incorporated
in revised Guideline 2B1.1. See U.S.S.GApp. C,
Amend. 617 (2001). However, the current version of
Guideline 2B1.1 should not be used in the present
case if it would violate the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution, for example, because applying the
current version produces a more detrimental result
than applying the version in effect at the time of the
commission of the offense. See U.S.S.G. §
1B1.11(b)(1) (2002); Schaefer, 291 F.3d at 936 n. 1;
United States v. Kosmel, 272 F.3d 501, 507 (7th
Cir.2001). In such situations, the Guidelines Manual
in effect on the date of the offense shall be applied in
its entirety. U.S.S.G. § IBM 1(b)(2) (2002). Because
of Guideline 2Bl.rs loss table, see U.S.S.G. §
2BM(b)(l)(K) (2002), and likely adjustment for
using sophisticated means, see id. § 2BM(b)(8Xc),
the offense level under the current Guidelines Manual
would be higher than under the 1995 Guidelines
Manual that was in effect when the offense was
completed in June 1996. Therefore, the 1995
Guidelines Manual will be employed in tentatively
calculating Loutos's sentencing range.
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*9 Under the 1995 Guidelines Manual, the Guideline
applicable to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 was
Guideline 2F1.1. Under that Guideline, the base
offense level and possible adjustments are
determined as follows.
The base offense level would be 6. U.S.S.G. §
2Fl.l(a).
The adjustment for a loss of more than $10,000,000
would be 15 levels. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1).
There would be a possible enhancement of 2 levels
because the offense involved more than one victim.
See U.S.S.G. § 2F 1.1(b)(2)(B). Relevant conduct is
to be considered in determining whether the offense
involved more than one victim. See U.S.S.G. § §
lB1.3(a)(ii), IB 1.3(a)(3); United States v. Lindsay,
184 F.3d 1138, 1141 n. 3 (10th Cir.), cert denied,
528 U.S. 981 (1999); United States v. Shumard, 120
F.3d 339, 340 (2d Cir. 1997).
There is a possible reduction of 2 levels for Loutos
being a minor participant. See U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.2(b).
Loutos contends he should instead get a 4-level
reduction under § 3B 1.2(a) because he is a minimal
participant, not just a minor participant. However,
there is evidence that his participation in the
investment fraud went beyond helping to open the
bank account and therefore was not minimal. Again,
no determination is presently being made as to
whether Loutos would be entitled to a 2-level
reduction, 4-level reduction, or no reduction
whatsoever under § 3B1.2. The issue is noted so that
the parties will be prepared to address it.
There is a possible 2-level enhancement for abuse of
a position of trust. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. There is
evidence that Loutos used his special skills or public
trust as an attorney "in a manner that significantly
facilitated the commission or concealment of the
offense." Id. See United States v. Foster, 868 F.Supp.
213, 216-17 (E.D.Mich. 1994) (use of client trust
account to launder money and aid in establishing
other accounts for money laundering constituted use
of special skill and also abuse of public trust); United
States v. Post, 25 F.3d 599, 600-01 (8th Cir. 1994)
(violated public trust by using status as attorney to
shroud insurance fraud claims with appearance of
regularity); United States v. Ross, 190 F.3d 446, 454
(6th Cir.), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1033 (1999) (used
special skill by providing legal assistance to drug
coconspirators).
Loutos may be entitled to a 2-level or 3-level
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reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See
U.S.S.G. § 3E 1.1. If it is found that the investment
fraud is relevant conduct, though, Loutos may not be
entitled to any adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility because he has continued to deny his
knowledge of and/or participation in the relevant
conduct. See United States v. Hernandez, 309 F.3d
458, 462-63 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Booker,
248 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir.2001).
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offense as described herein. By February 24. 2003,
each side shall file a sentencing memorandum. By
March 21, 2003, the probation officer shall issue a
supplemental or revised presentence report. Status
hearing will be held on March 26, 2003 at 11:00 a.m.
2003 WL 168627 (N.D.IU.)
END OF DOCUMENT

In addition to addressing how these adjustments
affect Loutos's possible sentencing range, the parties
should consider, in light of any adjustments based on
a loss amount or other grounds, a revised fine range
and the possible applicability of restitution.
VIII. Practice of Law
*10 The parties should address the question of
whether it would be appropriate to prohibit Loutos
from practicing law during any term of supervised
release that may be imposed. See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5;
United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 839 (2d
Cir.1995). See also United States v. Bernal 183
F.Supp.2d439(D.P.R.2001).
IX. Procedures
By February 3, 2003, the government shall provide
defendant and the probation officer a copy of the
government version of the offense that was provided
to the probation officers for purposes of sentencing
the codefendants. The government shall also provide
a supplement to this version specifically setting forth
any additional facts and issues concerning Loutos. By
February 24, 2003, each party shall file a sentencing
memorandum [FN 10] addressing the issues outlined
in today's order, including delineating any evidence
that a party believes would need to be presented. By
March 21, 2003, the probation officer shall provide
the parties and court with a supplement to (or revised
version of) the PSR. A status hearing will be held on
March 26, 2003 at 11:00 a.m. At the status hearing,
the parties shall be prepared to address any objections
they may have to die supplemental/revised PSR and
any need for a hearing on any contested factual
issues.

FN10. A copy shall also be provided to the
probation officer.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, by February 3,
2003, the government shall serve defendant and the
probation officer with a copy of its version of the
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

